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Human Complexity
The Final Frontier

Harry Francis Mallgrave

We often take it for granted that architecture is a visual art. We think
of it in visual terms. We design and
evaluate our productions visually.
We present our results to clients or
design juries in a visual format. We
publish our efforts on websites and
in journals with graphic images. But
do we experience a building or an
urban environment exclusively in
visual terms?
The perception of one’s surroundings
is, after all, a cross-modal or multisensory event. In entering a room
our bodies as a whole unthinkingly
experience a panorama of stimuli:
the fit of a door handle, the ease of a
tread/riser ratio, the tactile pressure
and texture of a flooring material, the
acoustic resonance of the space, the
hand of a fabric, the smell of materials, the warmth of sunlight through
a window, the sense of spatial relationships, or the flush of memories
recalled. Good architects, of course,
have always known the multiple dimensions of the built environment,
even if we often reduce it to the cartoon of a visual art.

64

Western philosophy has for millennia
constructed a similar two-dimensional images of ourselves. Only a
few years ago it was commonplace
to believe that we possess animal
bodies and thinking minds, and there
is scarcely a connection between the
two. We passively survey the world
with our retinal nerve cells, and these
stimuli are then passed to the higher
reaches of our brains, where they are
converted to ideas—the gist of our

Figure 1. Library of Celsus, Ephesus, Turkey, completed 135 CE.

mental existence. Presumably, we
think with these ideas.
Of course there have been exceptions
along the way. Baruch Spnoza, for example, argued that our animal spirits
(emotions) could not be so neatly
separated from our thinking activity.
Martin Heidegger suggested that we
cope with the things of the world not
symbolically but pre-theoretically—

that is, as “equipment” defined by
its manipulability or “handiness” to
our being.1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty
forcefully rejected “the age-old assumptions that put the body in the
world and the seer in the body, or
conversely, the world and the body
in the seer as in a box.”2 Similary, the
perceptual psychologist James Gibson defined a realm called “ecological
psychology,” which challenged the te-

net that there was “a world of mental
products distinct from the world of
material products.”3 He called such
a position “direct perception.”
More recently the neurophenomenologist Evan Thompson, in drawing
upon the insights of contemporary
neuroscience, has proffered a more
dynamic model of “radical embodiment,” by which the nervous system,

body, and environment (including
cultural) are interwoven developmental systems, in which nurture
(culture) cannot be distinguished
from our biological natures (genes).
Culture is something already enfolded or “woven into the very fabric
of each human mind from the beginning,” a part of a larger environmental
field that at the same time shapes
our cognitive evolution.4
Thompson’s model, which is indicative of a large body of theory that
has grown on the back of the newer
biological sciences, is however little
known to architects. We still tend to
think about design in conventional
two-dimensional terms or with the
traditional philosophical values of
yesterday. But has this always been
the case?
Early Theories of Empathy
Let us take the example of 19th-century philosophical theories and their

relation to architectural practice.
In his book The World as Will and
Representation (1818), the Kantian
philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer
initiated a line of thinking that would
have a profound effect on architectural practice. He believed that all of the
arts had to be represented by ideas,
and architecture, in particular, by the
ideas of gravity, cohesion, rigidity,
and hardness—what he termed the
“bass notes” of nature. The materials
that the architect employs are heavy
and gravity (a vital energy, the “will”
of nature) wants to pull them to the
ground. The task of the architect
therefore resides in representing this
conflict—that is, in creating a building system (columns, beams, arches,
vaults) that thwarts “these insatiable
forces of their shortest path to their
satisfaction.”5
Although the theoretical underpinnings to such a view were idealistic,
the architectural view that Schopenhauer presents is a highly material

Figure 2. Ionic columns within a community well at Ephesus.

Figure 3. Rustication detail of the Dresden Art Gallery,

and animistic one: the active forces
contained within materials held in
a temporary condition of abeyance,
a visual force-field as it were.
The architect Karl Friedrich Schinkel
was much moved by Schopenhauer’s
ideas, as was his protégé Karl Bötticher, who over hundreds of pages
referred to architecture as an “ideal
organism” in which a “formless condition” of matter is “resolved into a
dynamic expression.”6 Gottfried Semper, in his book Style in the Tectonic
and Technical Arts (1860-63), took
this animistic line of reasoning one
step further. All architectural forms,
he believed, are dynamic events. The
triangular form of the Attic gable, for
instance, exerts a downward pressure
and activates the vertical expression
of life inherent in the Doric column.
The “supple and elastic strength” of
an Ionic volute, again, mediates this
transfer of forces (load) in a gentler
way than its Doric counterpart: its
particular form “offers resistance
without violence.”7 (Figure 2 and 3) In
one vivid passage describing the rusticated blocks he used on the Dresden
Art Gallery, he spoke of how the lithic
forces pounded into these blocks
with a hammer and chisel remained
preserved or contained within the

stone as an energetic expression, and
how this activity could be enhanced
by directing the blows in a specific
way and framing them with bands so
as to endow the overall composition
with a visual “beat”—an allegory to
the idealist view of architecture as
“frozen music.”8
Semper’s perspective, outlined a full
40 years after Schopenhauer’s book
appeared, was fully in line with contemporary psychological and aesthetic theories. His colleague at the
ETH in Zurich, Friedrich Theodor
Vischer, believed that architecture
was a symbolic art, one in which the
architect was charged with infusing
matter with “buoyant life,” through
the linear and planar suspension of
its various parts. Vertical lines, he argued, elevate the human spirit, while
curved lines move more energetically
than straight lines. Our bodies and
brains respond to these forces with
“vibrations and-who knows what—
neural modifications” (his words)
because we have a “pantheistic” urge
to read our emotions into the forms
of the perceptual world.9 In a doctoral
dissertation of 1873, his son Robert
Vischer coined a word to describe
this process—Einfühlung, literally
“feeling into” the forms of the artistic
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Wölfflin’s contentions influenced
German architectural practice at the
time, but it also came to influence
aesthetic theory more broadly. One
person much impressed with the
theory was the British writer Vernon
Lee, who, when living in Florence,
was interested in testing such theory
empirically. Lee and her collaborator
Clementina Anstruther-Thomson
embarked on a series of experiments
recording the physiological responses of people experiencing buildings.
(Figure 5) In measuring the responses
of people standing before Leon Battista Alberti’s church of Santa Maria
Novella, they noted that the tripartite
organization of the facade prevented
“the thorax from collapsing as much

as usual during the act of expiration,”
how one’s respiration seems to find
an accord with the proportions of
the building, how the overall reading of the facade forces a certain
pressure on the feet and downward
pressure of the head, a feeling that is
offset by the upward springing lines
of the arches and the resulting feeling
of “harmonious completeness.”14 In
retrospect, it seems remarkable how
seriously people, even non-architects
such as Lee, were thinking about
architecture at this time.
Empathy and Mirror Neurons
A few years ago, in part because I had
translated the writings of several of

Figure 4. The Doric order of the Temple of Hephaestus, Athens, complete 415 BCE.

world.10 Some 30 years later, after
tens of thousands of pages were written on this theme, the term became
translated into English as “empathy,” an inadequate but nevertheless
widely accepted term today.
Robert Vischer’s term, nevertheless,
captured an important point. When
we perceive artistic form, our brains
and bodies undergo an immediate
and preconscious physiological
and neurological response, through
which we assign a valence or value
to the event. We like or we don’t like
what we are experiencing. Emotion
(defined simply as a response of an
organism to a stimulus) is in fact embedded in the perception; emotion is
the preconscious lens through which
we perceive the world. The role of
the architect or artist is to intensify
this sensuous reaction, as Vischer
noted, “every work of art reveals itself to us as a person harmoniously
feeling himself into a kindred object,
or as humanity objectifying itself in
harmonious form.”11
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Space does not permit us to explore
the many turn-of-the-century interpretations of this theme—which extend down to the early teachings of

the Bauhaus—but two individuals
who applied the theme of empathy
to architecture should be noted. One
was the art historian Heinrich Wölfflin,
who opened his doctoral dissertation
of 1886 with the question “How is it
possible that architectural forms are
able to elicit an emotion or a mood?”12
His response is that we animate architectural forms simply because we
have bodies. We experience buildings
through our bodily organizations because the perception of form sympathetically works on our internal organs,
leading to a psychological response.
(Figure 4) In this regard, and alluding
to Semper, Wölfflin insisted that a
Doric column “bends its head down” in
the exertion of assuming a load, while a
lighter Ionic volute mitigates this effect
because the heavy load is discharged
into the volute, which visually acts
as a flexible spring. He also extended
this empathetic response to buildings
as a whole. For instance, he preferred
the more horizontal and wider forms
of the Italian Gothic style over those
of northern Gothic, because in the
latter case, particularly with narrow
medieval townhouses, the “squeezing together, pressing upward” of the
forms created an uneasy feeling of
tension.13

Figure 5. Leon Battista Alberti, Facade of Santa Maria Novella, 1456-70.

Now let us connect these aspects
of our being. If we watch someone
we love hit their thumb with a hammer, we grimace in an empathetic response to their pain. If Phil Michelson
mirrors the golf swing of his father
( from the left side although he is
right-handed), he becomes a highly
proficient golfer at a precocious age.
Together, both events suggest that
we comprehend the world and learn
new things through our neurological
(preconscious) acts of simulation. We
now know, for instance, that we see
someone hitting their thumb with a
hammer we map this event onto the
area of our somatosensory cortex in
which the nerve cells of the thumb
are located. Children learn to ride
a bicycle not by reading a manual
but by watching an older sibling or
friend at work.

Figure 6. Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Neue Nationalgalerie, Berlin, 1968. Detail of the pin connection
with the Richard Serra sculpture in the background.

the writers noted above, I was invited
to a conference at the University of
British Columbia on the theme of
empathy. I expected the event to
be devoted to historical and phenomenological considerations of the
theme, and I was therefore both perplexed and surprised to find several
prominent neuroscientists in attendance. It happened that the theme
of empathy had suddenly come back
into vogue with a vengeance, thanks
to such neuroimaging technologies
such as Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (MRI). Scientists, with these
new tools, were for the first time
probing the neurological dynamics
into how we “feel ourselves into” or
emotionally relate to others.
These studies were prompted in part
by another scientific discovery that
had taken place in a neurological

laboratory at the University of Parma
in the early 1990s.15 With the use of
electrodes inserted into the brains
of macaques, scientists were recording neurological patterns in specific
areas of the brain while the monkeys
were performing such tasks as grasping a peanut. While they found these
patterns, they also found similar patterns of activity in monkeys who were
not grasping the objects, but who
were simply watching others perform
the act. Neurological activation was
found in two areas that instigate the
movements involved, but not in the
motor cortex, where we consciously
execute the activity. In other words,
in watching someone else perform
an activity, whether it is swinging
a golf club or a hammer, we simulate or prompt the same muscular
movements in our own brains—an
act scientists have called “embodied
simulation.”

Vittorio Gallese, one of the discoverers of mirror neurons, argues that the
mirror-neuron system solves a great
many other riddles, such how we
form a sense of self, how we socially
identify with others, have we come
to have spatial awareness, and even
how we have developed language.16
In the last regard Gallese, together
with the linguist George Lakoff,
have suggested that language came
about (very late in our evolutionary process) not through a process
of symbolic abstraction (so-called
reason) but rather through real-life
encounters with the world—that is,
through perceptual acts of simulating the gestures of others or in learning how objects are to be responded
to, handled, or manipulated.17
There are many architectural implications to mirror systems, as several
studies have shown. In one fMRI
study in which scientists were recording the mirror activity of people
watching others being touched by
humans and by objects, they also
found similar mirror activity when
people observed two inanimate objects touching one another. In their

concluding words: “Space around us
is full of objects accidentally touching each other, that is, without any
animate involvement. One could
observe a pine cone falling on the
garden bench in the park, or drips
splashing on the leaf of a plant during a downpour. Models of embodied
simulation posit that the same neural
structures involved in our own bodyrelated experiences contribute to the
conceptualization of what we observe
in the world.”18
Now consider the fact that the architect “designs” a three-dimensional
environment in which different materials touch one another. Architects
shape whole forms into an overall
composition and they detail materials joining one another—for instance,
how a wall meets a ceiling or how
in a column supports the load. One
might argue that the intersection
of this column and load is derived
from rational or structural reasoning
alone, but such an explanation does
not explain the intense artistic effort
that went into the creation of an Ionic
capital or a connection for a Meisian
building or Richard Serra sculpture.
(Figure 6) Contemporary models
of neuroscience suggest that we do
simulate or animate these structural
and material events, reaffirming what
theorists of empathy noted more than
a century ago (does not the Serra
sculpture feel like a pin prick?). We
embody the architectural experience
literally by “feeling ourselves into”
the design.
Embodied Design
There is still another dimension to
this fact. In compiling another series
of fMRI studies, David Freedberg and
Vittorio Gallese have recently argued
that we not only simulate these artistic events but we also simulate
“the artist’s creative gestures, such as
vigorous modeling in clay or paint,
fast brushwork and signs of the movement of the hand more generally.”19
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They make the case that in standing
before a Jackson Pollak painting, for
instance, we sense or feel the energy behind the force of paint being
splashed on the surface.
But do we not read architecture in
a similar way? In standing before
the Medici Palace in Florence, for
instance, do we not feel a sense of
awe by these enormous blocks and
(as Semper recorded) the force of
the hammer and chisel that worked
them? In approaching the Dominus
Winery, do we not read the stacks of
gabions as heavy because (as Wölfflin rightly surmised) we know the
weight of stone? (Figures 7 & 8) Do
not the curled titanium segments of
a Frank Gehry pavilion, conversely,
convey to us a sense of lightness
and freedom? In visiting a Gothic
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cathedral, do we not simulate the
delicacy of the mason’s chisel on the
stonework, those animating tactile
values that John Ruskin insisted upon
with his Lamp of Sacrifice? And is
this not the reason why Herzog &
De Meuron consistently modulate
the exterior skins of their buildings,
such as their use of weathered steel
for the Caxia Forum or the perforated
and indented metal panels used in
the De Young Museum? Is it not because they intuitively understand
that we indeed form an empathetic
relationship with the materials of
our built environment?
Architecture is beginning to enter a
very interesting period—not because
or parametric programs or the other
technologies that presently stand
at the disposal of the designer. It is

Figure 7. Herzog & de Meuron, Dominus Winery, 1997.

because another new realm has been
opened for architectural investigation and exploration—the breadth
and depth of human complexity. For
too many years we have ascribed to
a journal of architectural theory that
has promoted this craft as a formalist game intended to exploit highly
conceptualized values that were really intended only to demonstrate
the genius of the architect. Plato,
for one, scoffed at such pretensions,
at those who seek obscure and farflung knowledge without first understanding their own human natures.
He countered such vanity by citing
the maxim that was carved at the
entrance of the Temple of Apollo at
Delphi—“Know Thyself.”20
In this regard it might be useful to
note the work of Ellen Dissanayake.

This ethnologist has for years been on
the trail of the origin of the artistic
impulse by drawing upon evolutionary and anthropological evidence,
and by citing the human predisposition for ritualistic play and ceremonial behaviors.21 Her research
into this predilection for making
things “special,” which she has consistently underscored, underwent
a subtle but important change of
direction around the beginning of
this century, as new fields such as
neuroaesthetics began to ponder
similar issues. She rejected the early
efforts of some neuroscientists to
reduce artistic experience to formalist analysis and countered with the
very Darwinian notion that human
artistic impulses extend back to more
primal and pre-Paleolithic stages of
hominin evolution, that is, they arose
before and during “human evolution as multi-media elaborations of
rhythmic-modal capacities that by
means of these elaborations gave
emotional meaning and purpose to
biologically vital activities.”22 Hence,
the “rhythms and modes” associated
with artistic activities are in fact emotional drives born of adaptations and
enculturations, drives manifested
in such things as social affiliation,
making sense of our surroundings,
acquiring competence in skills, and
to the very special idea of “elaborating
upon” something. It is only when the
designer taps into these “cross-modal
sensations of tactility and kinesis,”
as Dissanayake refers to the artistic
process, that a work of art acquires
the charm of being both creative and
revelatory.
With all of our emphasis on methods
and models in architectural practice,
perhaps we have forgotten something
of fundamental importance about
this art. All good design is, in a cultural and personal sense, nothing
more than what Tim Ingold refers
to as a “variations” on our ingrained
bodily skills.23 And at this most primitive level, design is little more than

the embodied play of materials, colors, forms, spaces, patterns, sounds,
and other sensory values. Thus the
task of the architect, quite simply,
is to design an environment that is
creative and revelatory—revelatory
not of some arcane idea or ideological principle but allowing us to
experience or revel in our own vital
activities. Richard Neutra some years
ago cautioned the architect to forego “the pure aesthetics of a bygone
brand of speculation” and embrace
the “tools of sensory and cerebral
stimulation professionally.”24 It is time
for architects to take heed of this
advice. We are the people for whom
we design, and if we are beginning to
gain some insights into the natures
of our organisms, we should make
use of them, in fact exploit what is
it that allows people take pleasure
in their built environments.
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